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plication of these sections is to ignore the reality that the property was sold.
Gaither had nothing. Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 24 avails the trustee
nothing also. It concerns preferential treatment of creditors while insolvent,
and its pivotal date is four months before bankruptcy. This section further
stipulates that a proof of insolvency or reason to believe it must be shown.
In the Wethered case the equity court below held that there was no proof
of Gaither's apparent insolvency before bankruptcy and this finding was
affirmed.25
It is submitted that while the opinion skillfully and accurately treats
the legal questions involved the broad scope of the opinion is unnecessary and
tends to obfuscate the central holding.
PAUL T. O'GRADY
Constitutional Law—State Registration Statutes—Sales Promotion as
Intrastate Business.—Eli Lilly and Company v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc.'
—Eli Lilly and Company, an Indiana pharmaceutical corporation which
sold to wholesalers in New Jersey, maintained an office in Newark. Out
of this office eighteen detailmen were engaged in acquainting retailers, hos-
pitals, and physicians with the company's products, examining and making
recommendations with respect to retailers' stock inventories, and giving
advertising and promotional materials to retailers. Occasionally, they would
receive an order for transmittal to a wholesaler.
In a suit by Lilly to enforce its Fair Trade prices against a nonsigning
druggist,2 the defendant contended that Lilly had not complied with a New
Jersey statute denying access to its courts to any foreign corporation doing
business in the state which had not filed with the Secretary of State. 3 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the action of the trial court in grant-
ing the motion to dismiss, finding that Lilly was doing business in the state
and, therefore, subject to the statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed. HELD: 1) a manufacturer that sells only interstate
to wholesalers, but promotes sales from wholesalers to retailers within a
foreign state is engaged in intrastate business in that state and can be
licensed by it; 2) a license which prevents a foreign corporation, engaged
including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered. . . ."
24 Bankruptcy Act, § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958). While the critical date for this
section is four months prior to bankruptcy, Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder,
318 U.S. 434 (1943) and In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (D. Mo. 1943)
both held that when security instruments were never recorded they are to be construed
as if they had been filed on the date of bankruptcy.
25 Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co., 168 A.2d at 369.
1 Eli Lilly and Company v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 81 Sup. Ct. 1316 (1961).
2 Lilly had contracts with other druggists to sell at prices established by Lilly,
which prices were obligatory on the defendant under the nonsigner provision of the
New Jersey Act.
3 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:15-4 (1937).
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in some intrastate activity, from suing to enforce its Fair Trade prices against
a nonsigner is a valid one, because it does not infringe upon the interstate
aspects of the foreign corporation's business, insofar as the suit is "separable
from any particular interstate transaction."
Although a state may to some extent prohibit or license the intrastate
business of a foreign corporation, 4 any attempt by a state to prohibit or
condition the doing of interstate business, as by a license fee or registration
requirement, is void as a direct burden upon interstate commerce." A sale of
goods which are to be shipped from outside the state is a sale in interstate
commerce and, thus, protected,° but a sale by a branch of a corporation of
goods already in the state is generally regarded as intrastate business and,
therefore, subject to licensing statutes./
The Supreme Court has not allowed this principle of protection for
interstate commerce to be diluted by the presence in the state of some local
incident of the interstate transaction. If the local incidents are elements of
one unitary interstate transaction and not economically distinct, they are
protected. Thus, the solicitation of an interstate sale is protected as well
as the sale itself,' and this is true even though a local office may be provided
for the convenience of the soliciting agent.° Where a seller contracts to
install an article sold in interstate commerce, the entire transaction is pro-
tected if the installation is essential or at least appropriate to the sale, 1 ° as in
the case of a complex machine which the producer's mechanics are best
trained to install.
The instant case reiterates the rule invalidating even a mere qualifica-
tion statute, which might require only registration and a small fee to defray
expenses, where the corporation affected is doing only interstate business.
Although the rule against such statutes was first enunciated in the last cen-
tury" and has been well established by numerous Supreme Court and state
court decisions,12 qualification statutes have not been discussed by the
Supreme Court for eighteen years.'' Prior to Lilly, at least one writer had
expressed doubt as to whether they would at present be found invalid.' 4
The extent of such control is a question of the relation of the state police power
to interstate commerce.
5 Dalmke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).
6 Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); Caldwell v. North Carolina,
187 U.S. 622 (1902).
7 Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914).
B Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1886).
9 Cheny Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1917).
10 Compare Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1913) with York Mfg.
Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21 (1917).
11 Crutcher v. Kentucky, supra note 5.
12 E. Cr. Furst v. Brewer, 282 U.S. 493 (1931); Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere
Tire & Sales Co., 339 Mass. 131, 158 N.E.2d 134 (1959) ; International Text Book Co.
v. Tone, 220 N.Y. 313, 115. N.E. 914 (1917).
18 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1943).
14 17 Fletcher, Corporations, para. 8422, p. 387.
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This doubt is certainly understandable in light of the recent trend toward
increased state control in the fields of taxation 15 and service of process. 16
An argument can be made that the state interest in being notified of the
presence of foreign corporations outweighs the minor burden it may impose
upon interstate commerce. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the last decision
involving a qualification statute recognized such as a "conventional means
of assuring fair dealing on the part of foreign corporations coming into a
state."" However, this argument ignores the traditional approach that all
direct burdens on interstate commerce are invalid, without any weighing of
the state interest involved. In the Lilly case, the Court solidly lines up in
support of this traditional approach, although Mr. Justice Harlan in a
concurring opinion reserved decision on the question.' 8
Although the Court is almost unanimous on this point, it is split sharply,
five to four, in its decision that Lilly's activities are local and that it therefore
can be licensed by New Jersey. The problem of distinguishing interstate and
intrastate commerce has been the source of many tenuous distinctions and
much confusion and disagreement. It is an area where each particular fact
situation is of paramount concern. The present case lies in the gray area of
dispute, as the closeness of the decision attests.
However, it is submitted that, although technically the sales which are
being solicited by Lilly's agents take place entirely within the state of New
Jersey, it would be preferable to regard Lilly's activities as a part of its
interstate business and thus within the scope of the ban against licensing. The
Court's decisions, as noted above, have always sought to protect all those
activities which are so intrinsically connected with an interstate sale as to be
regarded as necessary elements of it. The distinction in the present case be-
tween the customary manner of directly soliciting sales by contacting the
party with whom the seller desires to contract and what may be called
indirect solicitation, in which only the ultimate market is contacted in the
hope of boosting the seller's sales to the middleman, seems unwarranted, at
least in the case of those manufacturers for which the best or, possibly, the
only financially feasible marketing plan is through the media of wholesalers.
Since many companies do not have the extensive marketing facilities necessary
to make sales direct to the public or to retailers and, thus, must use a whole-
saler to market their products, they can bring attention to their product only
through some form of "indirect" solicitation, whether it be detailmen or sales-
men, as in the instant case, or some form of advertising campaign. The
15 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) ;
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Comp., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); see also
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951).
10 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1946).
17 Supra note 13, at 208. This case, however, concerned a foreign corporation
which was held to be engaged in intrastate commerce, and, therefore, the question
involved was whether the state was indirectly burdening commerce by its exercise of
police powers.
38 Supra note 1, at 1321, n. I.
80
CASE NOTES
policy consideration protecting direct solicitation would seem to apply equally
here.
The same fundamental problem again is confronted in connection with
the Court's finding that Lilly's suit to enforce its Fair Trade prices against
a nonsigner is separable from the interstate sales of Lilly and, therefore,
subject to licensing. In suits upon the interstate contracts themselves, a state
cannot deny a foreign corporation access to its courts until compliance with
a registration statute.' 9 However, in the action brought by Lilly, it can be
argued that the suit is to fix the price of a product sold by a local retailer.
This would seem to make it a matter of purely local concern, which could
be barred by New Jersey's qualification statute. 2°
However, it seems difficult to segregate the interstate sales of certain
products and a suit to fix the price at which those products are ultimately
resold; The purpose of the suit is to protect the good will of the manufac-
turer,2t which is represented by the trademark on the goods sold interstate.
The protection of Lilly's good will by means of Fair Trade prices is an in-
herent part of the marketing arrangement for the interstate goods. 22 Further-
more, the fixing of prices in New Jersey is part of a nationwide plan and is
thus related to the commerce that Lilly does in other states. 23 Although,
again, it is a very difficult line to draw, it seems that there is a sufficient
nexus between the suit and Lilly's interstate activity so that it should not be
barred.
The Lilly case is illustrative of the difficulties inherent in this particular
area of constitutional law. It would also seem to have broad application. In
particular, a foreign corporation which does not have its own retail outlets
must now consider the licensing statutes of foreign states if it wishes to send
agents into those states to conduct any sort of promotional or advertising
campaign aimed at the public.
WALTER F. WELDON, JR.
Constitutional Law—Taxation—State Application of Allocation For-
mulas to a Multi-State Public Utility.—Virginia Electric and Power
Co. v. Currie.'—Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) is a Vir-
ginia corporation generating electricity primarily in Virginia and distributing
it throughout much of Virginia and parts of North Carolina and West Vir-
ginia. In April, 1954, VEPCO filed its 1953 North Carolina income tax
return computing it with reference to the state statutory allocation formula
19 International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910) ; Sioux Remedy Co. v.
Cope, supra note 6.
20 Supra note 3.
21 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
22 Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire and Sales Co., supra note 12.
23 Schweggman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951) ; Weco
Products Co. v. G.E.M. Inc., 1960 C.C.H. Trade Co. par. 69, 639 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).
1 254 N.C. 17, 118 S.E.2d 155 (1961), cert. denied, 81 S.C. 1919 (1961).
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